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NOTE
THE ALIEN TORT CLAIMS ACT AND SECTION
1983: THE IMPROPER USE OF DOMESTIC LAWS
TO "CREATE" AND "DEFINE" INTERNATIONAL
LIABILITY FOR MULTI-NATIONAL
CORPORATIONS
I.

INTRODUCTION

Amidst the rash of litigation generated by the Enron scandal, the
number of corporate defendants in U.S. courts may continue increasing
due to a recent interpretation of the Alien Tort Claims Act' ("ATCA")
expanding liability for corporate complicity in human rights violations
committed abroad.2 On September 18, 2002, the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit ruled that Unocal, a California multinational
corporation ("MNC"), must stand trial for possibly "aiding and abetting"
government authorities accused of subjecting their citizens to rape,
murder, and forced labor in Myanmar The case, one of many filed
against MNCs in recent years under the ATCA, represents the first of its
kind requiring a private MNC to stand trial for its connivance in human
rights violations committed abroad.
The case was brought by Burmese villagers against Unocal for its
involvement in a joint venture project ("Project") between Total, S.A., a
French oil company ("Total"), and the military government of Myanmar
1. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000).
2. See Pui-Wing Tam, Myanmar Human-Rights Suit Against Unocal is Reinstated, WALL
ST. J., Sept. 19, 2002, at A10. "'This ruling means that there's absolutely no debate that private
companies can be held liable [in U.S. courts] for overseas human-rights abuses,"' according to
attorney Terry Collingsworth of the International Labor Rights Fund regarding the September 18,
2002 decision, Doe v. Unocal Corp., Nos. 00-56630, 00-51797, 00-56628, 00-57195, 2002 WL
31063976 (9th Cir. Sept. 18, 2002).
3. See Tam, supra note 2.
4. See id.
5. Burma's elected government was overthrown by a military government in 1958. See Doe
v. Unocal Corp., 110 F. Supp. 2d 1294, 1296 (C.D. Cal. 2000). Thirty years later, a new military
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acting through its state-owned company, the Myanmar Oil and Gas
Enterprise.6 The Project's objective was to exploit the natural gas
deposits discovered in 1982 in the Yadana field off the coast of
Myanmar.' This would be achieved through the construction of a
pipeline passing through the Tenasserim region of southern Myanmar
that would transport extracted gas to the border with Thailand.!
Recognizing the importance of the pipeline's construction to the
Project, both Total and Unocal were concerned with the fact that the
Tenasserim region was home to a rebel group opposed to Myanmar's
military junta known as the State Law and Order Restoration Council
("SLORC"). 9 Accordingly, the SLORC-with Unocal's knowledge and
pursuant to an early agreement between Total and-increased its
military presence in the region to provide security for the Project and to
perform additional services to ensure the pipeline's expeditious
construction." However, while providing these services, villagers
inhabiting the Tenasserim region claimed that the SLORC subjected
them to multiple acts of violence in connection with the Project."
Consequently, in 1996, several villagers filed multiple claims in the
Central District Court of California under the ATCA 2 against Unocal, 3
government, naming itself the State Law and Order Restoration Council ("SLORC"), took control
of Burma and renamed the country Myanmar. See id.
6. See id. at 1296-97. Unocal was not a party to the initial agreements between the Myanmar
Oil and Gas Enterprise ("MOGE") and Total, S.A. ("Total") in connection with the joint venture
project ("Project"). See id. at 1297. However, in 1992, Unocal and Total negotiated the assignment
of a portion of Total's interest in the Project to Unocal. See id. at 1298.
7. See id. at 1296.
8. See id. at 1297.
9. See id. at 1297-98.
10. See id. at 1296-97. The Ninth Circuit eventually found Unocal's knowledge of the
SLORC's involvement with the Project undisputed in light of a Unocal memorandum reflecting its
understanding that four battalions of 600 men each would protect the pipeline corridor and that fifty
soldiers would be assigned to guard each survey team. See Doe v. Unocal Corp., Nos. 00-56630, 0051797, 00-56628, 00-57195, 2002 WL 31063976, at *2 (9th Cir. Sept. 18, 2002). However, the
court also concluded that there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the Project actually
hired the Myanmar Military through the MOGE to provide these services and whether Unocal had
any knowledge of that. See id. Among the evidence cited by the court was the Production Sharing
Contract entered into between Total and the MOGE before Unocal acquired an interest in the
Project providing that the MOGE would supply such services as may be requested by Total and its
assigns such as Unocal. See id.
II. More specifically, deposition testimony indicated that SLORC, under threat of violence,
forced entire villages to relocate for the benefit of the Project, forced plaintiffs and others to work
on the Project and serve as porters for the military for days at a time, and perpetrated numerous acts
of violence, such as torture, murder, and rape, in connection with the forced labor and relocations.
See Doe, 110 F. Supp. 2d at 1298.
12. See id. at 1303. In addition to claims alleging violations of international law pursuant to
the Alien Tort Claims Act ("ATCA"), plaintiffs alleged violations of the Racketeer Influenced and
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Total, and the SLORC.' 4 After several years of litigation, the only viable
claims remaining are those against Unocal for possibly "aiding and
abetting" acts of forced labor, murder, and rape in accordance with the
Ninth Circuit decision of September 18, 2002, which reversed an earlier
district court decision granting summary judgment in favor of Unocal.' 5
For the purposes of this Note, possibly the most germane aspect of
the Ninth Circuit decision arises from that court's use of an "aiding and
abetting" test16 to define private liability under the ATCA vis-i-vis the
"state action" test17 used by the district court, which formed the basis for
that court's earlier decision granting Unocal's motion for summary
judgment. 8 According to the district court, in order to allege conduct in
"violation of the law of nations" as required by the express terms of the
ATCA and previous cases interpreting it, plaintiffs must show that
Unocal engaged in "state action" as defined through reference to 28
U.S.C. section 1983 jurisprudence.' 9 Section 1983 is a domestic law
which holds private entities liable for civil rights violations, normally
only actionable against the state, when those violations take place "under
the color" of government authority. 0 Section 1983 jurisprudence applies
four distinct tests to the facts of each case2 and imputes civil rights
liability onto private individuals when they act together with state
Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1961 (2002), et seq., as well as California tort law. See Doe,
110 F. Supp. 2d at 1303.
13. The defendants, collectively referred to as "Unocal" in the two related actions brought by
the villagers from the Tenasserim region, include Unocal Corporation, its wholly owned subsidiary
named the Union Oil Company of California, and two Unocal executives, John Imle and Roger
Beach. See id. at 1295.
14. See id. at 1303.
15. In 1997, the SLORC was dismissed as a defendant pursuant to the Foreign Sovereigns
Immunity Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-11 (1994), on the grounds that it was immune from suit. See Doe
v. Unocal Corp., 963 F. Supp. 880, 886 (C.D. Cal. 1997), aff'd, 2002 WL 31063976. In the
following year, Total was dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction under California's long arm
statute. See Doe v. Unocal Corp., 27 F. Supp. 2d 1174, 1186 (C.D. Cal. 1998). In 2000, the district
court granted Unocal's motion for summary judgement with respect to plaintiff's ATCA claims for
forced labor, murder, rape and torture. See Doe, 110 F. Supp. 2d at 1311. However, the Ninth
Circuit's decision on September 18, 2002, reversed the District Court's grant of Unocal's motion for
summary judgment only with respect to plaintiff's ATCA claims for forced labor, murder, and rape,
finding insufficient evidence to assert a claim for torture under the ATCA. See Doe, 2002 WL
31063976, at *24.
16. See Doe, 2002 WL 31063976, at *10.
17. The state action test used by the district court was based on 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Doe,
110 F. Supp. 2d at 1305.
18. See id. at 1306-07.
19. See id. at 1304-06.
20. See George v. Pac.-CSC Work Furlough, 91 F.3d 1227, 1229-30 (9th Cir. 1996).
21. See id. at 1230 (noting that the four tests applied by § 1983 jurisprudence are public
function, state compulsion, nexus, and joint action).
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officials or with significant state aid. 22 The district court justified its use
of section 1983 standards to define individual liability imposed by the
law of nations by reasoning that the effect of section 1983-which is to
impute individual liability for civil rights violations normally confined to
the state-is analogous to the goal of holding individuals liable for
violations of the law of nations, traditionally confined to nation-states
pursuant to the ATCA.23
In granting Unocal's motion for summary judgment, the district
court held that the plaintiffs' ATCA claims must fail as a matter of law
for want of evidence establishing Unocal's "control" of the SLORC's
decision to commit violent acts which necessary to establish proximate
cause as required by section 1983 jurisprudence.24 However, according
to the Ninth Circuit, the "state action" analysis borrowed from
section 1983 jurisprudence by the district court to define private liability
under the ATCA was unnecessary under the circumstances of the case.25
In its place, the Ninth Circuit required the application of an "aiding and
abetting" test, borrowed from international law, to define Unocal's
liability under the ATCA.26
The Ninth Circuit began its analysis with respect to the district
court's state action requirement by noting Judge Edwards's observance
in Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic,27 that there are a handful of crimes
to which the law of nations attributes individual liability where state
action is not required. 28 Additionally, the court noted the reasoning in
Kadic v. Karadzic,29 which extended Judge Edwards approach by
holding that private individuals may be liable for acts proscribed by
international law only when committed by state actors to the extent they
were committed in pursuit of acts proscribed by international law
regardless of state action. ° Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit held that
Unocal may be liable, regardless of state action, to the extent that Unocal
"aided and abetted" the SLORC in committing acts proscribed by the
law of nations." However, the court did not directly address the issue of

22. See Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 245 (2d Cir. 1995).
23. See Doe, 110 F. Supp. 2d at 1305.
24. See id. at 1307.
25. See Doe v. Unocal Corp., Nos. 00-56630, 00-51797, 00-56628, 00-57195, 2002 WL
31063976, **8-9 (9th Cir. Sept. 18, 2002).
26. See id. at *10.
27. 726 F.2d 774, (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Edwards, J., concurring).
28. See Doe, 2002 WL 31063976, at *9.
29. 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995).
30. See Doe, 2002 WL 31063976, at *9.
31. Seeid. at*10.
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under what circumstances, if any, section 1983 may be used to define
private liability under the ATCA.
This Note examines the recent developments in U.S. courts that
have led to the application of section 1983 in ATCA cases. This is
accomplished generally by discussing two of the obstacles faced by the
32 which was
court in Filartiga v. Pena-Irala,
the first circuit court to
interpret the ATCA, and by comparing that court's resolutions to other
decisions addressing the same issues. Part II of this Note offers a
background of ATCA litigation to illustrate the specific issues addressed
in this Note as well as the arguments against using section 1983
standards to define and create private liability under the ATCA. Part III
discusses the evolution of the individual's obligations under
international law. Additionally, this Part identifies how the Second
Circuit's decisions in Filartiga and Kadic led to the employment of
section 1983 standards in cases involving MNCs. Part IV addresses the
first obstacle faced by the court in Filartiga of ascertaining the
appropriate sources and definition of the law of nations, and compares
Filartiga'sextensive approach to that of other ATCA cases conducting
inquiries into the definition of the law of nations. This is done primarily
to emphasize the stringent requirements that must be met before a court
can apply its derivation of the law of nations pursuant to the ATCA.
Part V addresses the second obstacle faced by the Filartiga court of
establishing the justiciability of ATCA cases in U.S. federal courts.
Furthermore, this section discusses the differing approaches used by
courts to interpret the ATCA, resulting in inconsistent decisions
regarding the extent to which jurisdiction and a cause of action may be
granted by the ATCA. Part VI concludes that the use of section 1983
standards are improper as a matter of law and justice, and should never
be used to define or create private liability in ATCA cases.
II.BACKGROUND
For MNCs tracking the development of the Unocal case, the use of
an "aiding and abetting" test, vis-t-vis one of "state action" to define
private liability under the ATCA, is important because it potentially
lowers the bar significantly for aliens to sue MNCs in U.S. courts.33
However, for those unfamiliar with ATCA litigation, understanding the
legal mechanism empowering a U.S. court to adjudicate the international
rights of non-U.S. citizens for acts committed outside U.S. borders may
32. 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
33. See Tam, supra note 2.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2002

5

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 31, Iss. 1 [2002], Art. 6

HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 31:207

be of greater importance. Therefore, brief mention of the origins of
modern ATCA jurisprudence is appropriate before reaching the issue of
determining the appropriate standards defining private liability vis-A-vis
state actor liability under the ATCA.
The ATCA provides that "district courts shall have original
jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in
violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States. 34 The
modern interpretation of this more than two hundred year old statute was
35
born in 1980 by way of the landmark decision Filartiga.
With that
decision, the pioneering judges of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit took what it called "a small but important step in the
fulfillment of the ageless dream to free all people from brutal
violence. 36 Through its seminal interpretation of the ATCA, the
Filartigacourt achieved this great "step" by finding the ATCA to be an
appropriate conduit to U.S. courts for foreign-born citizens seeking civil
damages caused by conduct in violation of "the law of nations"
committed anywhere in the world.37 More specifically, the court
construed the ATCA "not as granting new rights to aliens, but simply as
opening the federal courts for adjudication of the rights already
recognized by international law."38 Therefore, under Filartiga's
formulation of the ATCA, the statute serves as both a jurisdictional grant
and a cause of action for aliens alleging recognized violations of the law
of nations.39
In the wake of Filartiga,several cases were filed under the ATCA
in U.S. courts by aliens alleging violations of international human rights
committed around world.4 0 However, because Filartiga's holding
seemed to leave open whether the ATCA applies only to state actors or
to nonstate actors as well, courts have struggled in their application of
the ATCA to private MNCs. 4'
The problem exists generally in ascertaining the rights and
obligations that are imposed by the law of nations on private individuals
34. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000).
35. 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
36. Id. at 890.
37. See id. at 887.
38. Id.
39. See Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 777 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Edwards, J.,
concurring). But see id,
at 801 (Bork, J., concurring) (requiring an express grant of a cause of action
from international law to maintain an action in U.S. courts pursuant to the ATCA).
40. See, e.g., Forti
v. Suarez-Mason, 672 F. Supp. 1531 (N.D. Cal. 1987); hire Marcos, 25
F.3d 1467 (9th Cir. 1994); Iwanowa v. Ford Motor Co., 67 F. Supp. 2d 424 (D.N.J. 1999); Kadic v.
Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995).
41. See Doe v. Unocal Corp., 110 F. Supp. 2d 1294, 1304 (C.D. Cal. 2000).
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(including MNCs) vis-A-vis obligations imposed on nations recognized
as members of the international community and their official agents.
Historically, the law of nations was predominantly statist, leaving
individuals as mere objects of international law as opposed to its
subjects.42 However, the genocides of the last century and the correlative
development of international human rights law elevated individuals to
the status of subjects of international law with both rights and duties not
to violate the human rights of others. 43 Nevertheless, the private
individual's true status in international law has remained uncertain and
is hotly debated amongst legal scholars." At issue within the context of
this Note is the extent of a private individual's (or more specifically, a
private MNC's) liability for human rights violations of the law of
nations pursuant to the ATCA.
"Confusion arises because the term 'individual liability' denotes
two distinct forms of liability., 45 "The first, now well-implanted in the
law of nations, refers to individuals acting under color of state
law... [while] [t]he second, currently less-established [form of
liability] ... addresses the responsibility of individuals acting separate
from any state's authority or direction."" The latter form of individual
liability that exists in the absence of colorable state action is strictly
limited to "offenses recognized by the community of nations as of
universal concern., 47 This unique category of internationally recognized
offenses is also known as jus cogens," preemptory norms, or natural
law.49 Due to the requirement that these offenses be of universal concern,
courts and the Restatement (Third) Foreign Relations Law of the United
States section 404 (2002) (Restatement (Third)) have strictly limited the

42. See

RICHARD B.

LILLICH

&

HURST HANNUM,

PROBLEMS OF LAW, POLICY, AND PRACTICE

INTERNATIONAL

HUMAN

RIGHTS:

92-94 (3d ed., Aspen Law & Bus. 1995).

43. See id. at 94.
44. See, e.g., Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 794 (Edwards, J., concurring) ("[F]or each article
sounding the arrival of individual rights and duties under the law of nations, another surveys the
terrain and concludes that there is a long distance to go").
45. Id. at 793.
46. Id.
47. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 404 (2002)
[hereinafter RESTATEMENT (THIRD)]. "A state has jurisdiction to define and prescribe punishment
for certain offenses recognized by the community of nations as of universal concern, such as piracy,
slave trade, attacks on or hijacking of aircraft, genocide, war crimes, and perhaps certain acts of
terrorism, even where [no other basis of jurisdiction] is present." Id.
48. This is Latin for "Compelling Law." See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 864 (7th ed. 1999).
49. A more detailed explanation of these universal norms and an explanation of why they do
not necessitate colorable state action is offered in Part IV of this Note.
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types of offenses that can be considered jus cogens to such acts as
piracy, slave trading, and genocide."0
On the other hand, the former category of individual liability,
existing for offenses performed under the color of state law, is well
established and can therefore attribute individual liability pursuant to the
5
ATCA for such acts as "official torture," as was the case in Filartiga.
Filartiga held that pursuant to "the renunciation of torture as an
instrument of official policy by virtually all of the nations of the world,"
as substantiated by the express statements made in numerous
international agreements, there is sufficient agreement among civilized
nations to conclude that official torture is prohibited by the law of
nations. 2 However, while the simple act of torture is egregious in and of
itself, the individual liability for traditionally statist law established in
Filartigawas predicated on the fact that the defendant performed the act
in his official capacity as the Inspector General of Police, thereby acting,
in fact, as an official agent of the state.53 Therefore, by virtue of
Filartiga,as well as the statist nature of international law, one can easily
argue that the imposition of individual liability, traditionally reserved for
nation-states, is only available for an official state agent acting in an
official capacity. This is because, as a practical matter, only the acts of
an official agent can be can be clearly and factually attributed to the state
in which the actions took place by virtue of the status and authority
conferred upon her by that state.
The restriction of individual liability imposed by international law
to an official state agent flows naturally from the international law
doctrine of state action, which imputes liability onto a State for
violations of international law resulting from the actions of its official
agents 4 The doctrine is premised on the notion that the state and its
official agents, which represent the only means by which a state can act,

50. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 47, § 404; see also Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab
Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 794 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (noting that only a handful of acts, such as piracy and
slave trade, have been recognized as imposing individual liability absent colorable state action).
51. See 630 F.2d 876, 884 (2d Cir. 1980).
52. Id. at 880 (emphasis added).
53. See id. ("[W]e find that an act of torture committed by a state official against one held in
detention violates established norms of the international law of human rights, and hence the law of
nations.") (emphasis added).
54. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 47, § 207(c) ("A state is responsible for any
violation of its obligations under international law resulting from action or inaction by ... any
organ, agency, official, employee, or other agent of a government or of any political subdivision,
acting within the scope of authority or under color of such authority.").
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comprise the same entity, and hence are subject to the same laws.55 By
virtue of this doctrine, it is logical to conclude that the agent herself may
also be bound as an individual by these rules when acting in an official
capacity, because the acts performed by a state's individual agent in her
official capacity are subject to the rules imposed by international law.56
By that same reasoning however, one may also argue that just as
the State is not responsible under international law for the actions of
private individuals, 57 neither can a private individual be bound by that
law. Therefore, because individual liability for statist law proceeds from
the fact that the individual is acting on behalf of the state due to the
official status conferred upon her by the state,58 it is improper to extend
this liability to private individuals absent justification from the law of
nations itself. In support of this logic, it should be noted that subsequent
cases interpreting the ATCA have refused to extend the holding in
Filartigato cover the same acts of torture when performed by nonstate
actors who do not proceed in any official capacity whatsoever absent
appropriate justification from the law of nations.59 Therefore, as a
threshold matter in cases against individual defehdants not alleging
violations of jus cogens, courts must determine whether the individual is
in fact acting under the color of state law before individual liability may
be found pursuant to the ATCA.
As exemplified in the introduction of this Note, courts faced with
claims brought against private entities (including MNCs) for
international human rights violations have employed the domestic
"under the color of law" jurisprudence of section 198360 to determine
whether a private entity has acted under the color of state law for the
purposes of attributing state reserved liability. 6' At issue is whether
section 1983 can and should be used in ATCA cases to impute state
55. See, e.g., id. at cmt. a (noting that a state may act through various agencies and
instrumentalities, all actions of which being generally attributable to the state and hence subject to
international law).
56. See id. § 207(c).
57. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 47, § 207 cmt. c.
58. See, e.g., Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 672 F. Supp. 1531, 1546 (N.D. Cal. 1987) (stating with
reference to the holding in Filartiga that "a police chief who tortures, or orders to be tortured,
prisoners in his custody fulfills the requirement that his action be 'official' simply by virtue of his
position and the circumstances of the act").
59. See, e.g., Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 795 (D.C. Cir. 1984) ("While
I have little doubt that the trend in international law is toward a more expansive allocation of rights
and obligations to entities other than states, I decline to read [the ATCA] to cover torture by nonstate actors, absent guidance from the Supreme Court on the statute's usage of the term 'law of
nations."').
60. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994).
61. See, e.g., Doe v. Unocal Corp., 110 F. Supp. 2d 1294, 1305 (C.D. Cal. 2000).

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2002

9

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 31, Iss. 1 [2002], Art. 6

HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 31:207

reserved liability on private MNCs as defendants in ATCA cases. While
it is a noble goal to offer judicial relief pursuant to the ATCA to aliens
suffering legitimate human rights violations supported by MNCs, this
Note argues that it is improper, as a matter of law and justice, to utilize
this domestic law to create and impose new individual obligations never
contemplated by the law of nations.
This Note posits several arguments criticizing the use of
section 1983 in ATCA cases under any circumstances. First, the
employment of section 1983 to determine state action after determining
that a jus cogen violation has been alleged flies in the face of Filartiga's
goal to fulfill "the ageless dream to free all people from brutal
violence ' '62 as well as the "humanitarian and practical considerations
[which] have combined to lead the nations of the world to recognize that
respect for fundamental human rights is in their individual and collective
interest. 63 That is because jus cogens, which by its definition is a norm
that is universal, specific, and obligatory, 64 imposes obligations on
individuals regardless of whether they proceed under the color of any
state's authority.6 ' Therefore, the employment of a section 1983 analysis
to jus cogens violations creates an unnecessary obstacle for ATCA
plaintiffs alleging such violations, thereby causing liability to turn on an
analysis of domestic law, vis-a-vis evidence that the act alleged
constitutes a violation of universal international concern.
In addition to criticizing the use of section 1983 within the context
of jus cogens violations, this Note argues against its use to expand the
obligations imposed by customary international law. That is because66
customary international law as well as the precedent set by Filartiga
confines its reach to de facto state actors, vis-a-vis de jure state actors"
62. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 890 (2d Cir. 1980).
63. Id.
64. See Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 781 (Edwards, J., concurring).
65. See, e.g., id.; Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 242-43 (2d Cir. 1995).
66. While the narrow holding in Filartiga is technically only binding as precedent within the
Second Circuit and other jurisdictions that have accepted it as such, due to its codification by
Congress within the Tortured Victims Protection Act, the express statements made by Congress
acknowledging its general approval, as well as the wide approval received by this case in other
circuit decisions, great deference to its specific holding should be given. See Torture Victim
Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73 (1992); see also S. REP. NO. 102-249, at
4 (1991) (explaining that Filartiga "has met with general approval"); Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F.
Supp. 162, 179-80 (D. Mass. 1995); Frolova v. USSR, 761 F.2d 370, 374 n.6 (7th Cir. 1985).
67. Within the context of this Note, a de facto state actor refers to an individual who is a state
actor in fact; that is to say, one acting in his/her official capacity on behalf of the state (for example,
the defendant in Filartiga can be considered a de facto state actor due to his position as the
Inspector General of Police of Paraguay who committed acts of torture in his official capacity)
while a de jure state actor refers to an individual whose status as a state actor results from a legal

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol31/iss1/6

10

Khalil: The Alien Tort Claims Act and Section 1983: The Improper Use of D

20021

THE IMPROPER USE OF DOMESTIC LAWS

who violate that law in their official capacity. Essentially, the use of
section 1983 to define obligations imposed by customary law creates a
legal fiction by establishing MNCs as de jure state actors to circumvent
the reach of customary law and the narrow holding in Filartiga, to
thereby expand individual liability reserved for actual state actors onto
private individuals. Moreover, the use of domestic law to portray private
action as state action avoids the requirement that these obligations
command the general consent of civilized nations before they become
binding rules of the law of nations. 68 Therefore, absent international
recognition of private individual liability for a particular offense of
customary law, MNCs established merely as de jure state actors do not
satisfy the de facto state action requirement found in customary law as
expressed in Filartiga,and cannot be held liable for violations of the law
of nations. Furthermore, because the express language of the ATCA
requiring a violation of the law of nations69 is not satisfied, the ATCA
may not grant federal courts subject matter jurisdiction to hear cases
brought against MNCs, which define state action by way of section 1983
in the absence of ajus cogens violation.7 °
This Note argues further that the standards employed in
section 1983 jurisprudence are, as a practical matter, inappropriate to
define or expand individual liability for violations of international law.
While the analogy between the application of section 1983 to individuals
in civil rights case and its application to MNCs in ATCA cases seems
sound in theory, it does not lead to the conclusion that section 1983
standards, which have been calibrated to reflect American sensibilities
towards the civil rights of her citizens, can also justify the expansion of
individual liability for violations of international law. Accordingly, the
use of section 1983 standards calibrated to effectuate U.S. sensibilities in
ATCA cases would constitute a tenuous expansion of the liability
available pursuant to customary law and unjustifiably threatens to
expose MNC's, as well as private individuals around the world, to an

fiction (for example, a de jure state actor would be a private individual or multinational corporation
("MNC") whose status as a state actor is determined solely by reliance on § 1983 standards).
68. See Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 881 (noting the requirement that rules command the general
assent of civilized nations before they become binding as customary international law).
69. This statement assumes that the alternative, which requires a claim of a violation of a
United States treaty, is unavailable to the plaintiff, which is usually the case in ATCA claims.
70. See Filartiga,630 F.2d at 887-89 (predicating subject matter jurisdiction upon a showing
of a violation of the law of nations).
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open range of liability. Moreover, this tenuous expansion of liability
may serve to harm U.S. foreign relations.7
III. THE EVOLUTION OF THE INDIVIDUAL'S OBLIGATIONS UNDER
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE IMPROPER USE OF SECTION 1983 TO
EXPAND THESE OBLIGATIONS

.A. The Nuremberg Trials
The fact that the individual's status in international law has
remained in flux since the end of the seventeenth century when the
ATCA was drafted, explains in part, the mixed view regarding the extent
of individual liability imposed by international law.72 Throughout the
eighteenth and the beginning of the nineteenth century, scholars believed
that international law was binding on both individuals as well as states.73
Conversely, in the nineteenth century, the view that the law of nations
grants rights
to states alone became firmly
entrnchd
i and
boh confers
dotrieobligations
ad
•74
entrenched in both doctrine and practice. As noted in the previous
section of this Note, this statist view considered nation-states subjects of
international law while individuals, in contrast, were considered mere
objects of this law.75
Nevertheless, the atrocities witnessed by the victorious Allies after
World War II created a moral obligation upon them to punish the
perpetrators of these crimes against humanity 6 To illustrate this moral
obligation, the Filartigacourt made the following comments regarding
the international community's current view towards ending such
violence:
In the twentieth century the international community has come to

recognize the common danger posed by the flagrant disregard of basic
human rights and particularly the right to be free of torture. Spurred
first by the Great War, and then the Second, civilized nations have
banded together to prescribe acceptable norms of international
71. See TAM, supra note 2 (noting that the Bush administration has intervened in court cases
on behalf of multinational corporations notifying judges that the cases threatened to harm U.S.
foreign relations).
72. See Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 794 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Edwards, J.,
concurring).
73. See id.
74. See id.
75. See supra notes 42-43 and accompanying text.
76. See David F. Klein, A Theory For The Application Of The Customary InternationalLaw
Of Human Rights By Domestic Courts, 13 YALE J. INT'L L. 332, 340 (1988).
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behavior. From the ashes of the Second World War arose the United
Nations Organization, amid hopes that an era of peace and cooperation
had at last begun. Though many of these aspirations have remained
elusive goals, that circumstance cannot diminish the true progress that
has been made. In the modem age, humanitarian and practical
considerations have combined to lead the nations of the world to
recognize that respect for fundamental
human rights is in their
77
individual and collective interest.
The dilemma created by accepting the moral obligation to punish
individual perpetrators of crimes against humanity was that the private
individual's rights and obligations had never been clearly established as
being imposed by the law of nations.78 Ultimately, however, the
Nuremberg Trials concluded that the individual Nazi criminals violated
preexisting international norms and therefore were subject to
international individual liability for their actions.79 Commentators
routinely trace the origins of international individual liability for acts
committed under the color of state law vis- -vis jus cogens to this
development at the Nuremberg Trials.8 °
Post war case law dealing with individual rights and obligations
imposed by the law of nations have not been a model of consistency.
Most of the cases brought in federal courts have based jurisdiction and a
cause of action on the express language of the ATCA, which requires a
violation of the law of nations. One of the major problems in
adjudicating these cases is determining whether a private individual may
be held liable for violating the laws of nations. A brief analysis of the
evolution of the use of section 1983 to expand the obligations imposed
by the law of nations to private individuals will aid in ascertaining the
functional dilemmas in holding MNCs liable for acts that do not violate
recognized jus cogens pursuant to the ATCA.

B. Relevant Cases
1. Filartigav. Pena-Irala,A New Era
Dr. Filartiga and his daughter, both citizens of Paraguay, brought
suit in a U.S. federal court under the ATCA against the Inspector
General of Police of Paraguay for the wrongful death of a member of

77. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 890 (2d Cir. 1980).
78. See Klein, supra note 76, at 340.
79. See id.
80. See id.
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their family.8' The defendant, while in the United States under a visitor's
visa, was personally served with process for this claim. The plaintiffs
claimed that the kidnapping, torture, and subsequent death of Joelito
Filartiga at the hands of the defendant constituted a violation of the law
of nations pursuant to the ATCA.82 The court held that:
[i]n light of the universal condemnation of torture in numerous
international agreements, and the renunciation of torture as an
instrument of official policy by virtually all of the nations of the
world... an act of torture committed by a state official against one
held in detention violates established norms of the international law of
human rights, and hence the law of nations."
In reaching its decision, the Filartigacourt initially addressed the
issue of whether official torture constitutes a violation of the law of
nations. After identifying and analyzing the appropriate sources from
which international law is derived-the usage of nations, judicial
opinions, and the works of jurists-the court answered this question
affirmatively.85 To begin its analysis, the court, relying on the statements
made by the Supreme Court in The Paquete Habana,86 concluded that "it
is clear that courts must interpret [customary] international law not as it
was in 1789 [the year the ATCA was enacted,] but as it has evolved and
exists among the nations of the world today. 87 Furthermore, the court
recognized the stringent requirement that a rule command the "'general
assent of civilized nations"' to become binding upon them." Moreover,
the court acknowledged that "[w]ere this not so, the courts of one nation
might feel free to impose idiosyncratic legal rules upon others, in the
name of applying international law., 89 Accordingly, the court, making
reference to several international documents, including the United
Nations Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
concluded that official torture is proscribed by the law of nations.9"

81. See Filartiga,630 F.2d at 878.
82. See id. at 880.
83. Id. (emphasis added).
84. See id.
85. See id.
86, 175 U.S. 677 (1900).
87. Filartiga,630 F.2d at 881. Here the court noted that Habana was particularly instructive
for its present purpose because this case held that a standard that had begun as one of comity had
ripened into a settled rule of international law by the general assent of civilized nations. See id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. See id. at 883.
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The court noted that these international agreements are neither selfexecuting nor binding as a treaty. Rather, they can be considered an
"authoritative statement" in the international community which lends
support to the conclusion that official torture has become what can be
considered a violation of universally accepted international law." Upon
this analysis, the court felt justified in its conclusion that the law of
nations defines a specific obligation imposed upon individuals not to
engage in the official torture of another held in detention, and therefore,
such action constitutes a violation of the law of nations for the purposes
of establishing liability pursuant to the ATCA.92
The second question that was addressed was whether or not federal
jurisdiction in this case may be exercised.93 The defendant argued that
even if a tort was found to violate the law of nations, Article III of the
Constitution does not permit an exercise of jurisdiction for this case.94
However, this argument was rejected under the reasoning that "[t]he
constitutional basis for the Alien Tort Statute is the law of nations,
which has always been part of the federal common law" and that
Congress intended to confer judicial power and is authorized to do so by
Article l1.9'Furthermore, the court noted that it was not unusual for a
United States court to adjudicate tort claims that have arisen outside of
its territorial borders.96 Based on these conclusions, the court, applying a
broad interpretation of the ATCA, found that jurisdiction pursuant to the
Act will exist upon a showing of a violation of the law of nations.97
Finally, in dicta, the court addressed in passing whether or not the
suit could be barred by the act of state doctrine.98 The court stated that
they "doubt whether action by a state official in violation of the
Constitution and laws of the Republic of Paraguay, and wholly
unratified by that nation's government, could properly be characterized
as an act of state." 99
For the purposes of this Note, possibly the most germane aspect of
this case arises from a section 1983 reference the Filartigacourt used in
' The reliance by later
an analogy discussed in detail below.M
courts
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.

See id.
See id.
See id. at
See id.
Id.
See id.
See id. at
See id. at
Id.
See id. at

885.

887.
889.
885 n.18.
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adjudicating claims under the ATCA for guidance in determining
whether "state action" by private entities exists may have resulted from
and an overextension of the reference to section 1983 in that analogy.
That is to say, to demonstrate the appropriateness of adjudicating a claim
that occurred in Paraguay,'"' Filartigaestablishes consistency between
United States policy and Paraguayan law by illustrating that a United
States government official who committed the alleged acts could, by
virtue of section 1983, be guilty of violating United States law just as the
defendant would be held liable under Paraguayan law.' °2 That reference
to section 1983 may have paved the way for later courts to recognize
that a MNC found to be a de jure state actor by virtue of section 1983,
vis-A-vis a de facto state actor, could still be liable for violating the law
of nations.
2. Kadic Ignites a New Paradigm
After Filartiga,plaintiffs brought several cases under the ATCA in
federal courts claiming violations of international human rights. Most
notable perhaps was Kadic v. Karadzic,'3 which can be viewed in some
respects as an expansion of the holding in Filartiga.The Kadic decision
was "the first to hold that there is subject matter jurisdiction under the
ATCA for actions in which a nonstate defendant is said to have violated
the law of nations."' ° In that case, the defendant, former president of the
ruling Bosnian Serb entity, was accused of committing human rights
101. During the course of the court's discussion regarding jurisdiction, the court addressed
whether or not it is improper for United States Courts to adjudicate over a claim that arose in
Paraguay. See id. at 885. They began by noting that pursuant to Anglo-American law, it is not
unusual for courts to adjudicate over claims that have taken place outside of their territorial
jurisdiction. See id. They continued by stating that for the purposes of comity in the course of state
court practice in the United States, state courts will adjudicate claims arising in foreign states, so
long as there is personal jurisdiction, the act complained of would be in violation of the foreign
jurisdiction's law, and the policies of the forum and the foreign jurisdiction are consistent. See id.
They went on to note that there is personal jurisdiction in this case, and that both parties agree that
the actions performed by the defendant in this case were in violation of Paraguayan law. See id.
However, in an attempt to illustrate that the "policies of the forum" and the "foreign jurisdictions"
are consistent, the court referred to 42 U.S.C § 1983 in footnote eighteen. See id. In this footnote,
the court noted that pursuant to § 1983, it is possible to hold a private entity liable for certain
violations of law, or more specifically, due process violations, when performed under the color of
government authority. See id. This analogy was germane to establishing that this forum is proper as
well as for justifying the court's analogy to state court practice as a validation for adjudicating this
claim in a United States court, even though it took place in Paraguay between and among
Paraguayan citizens. See id.
102. See id.
103. 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995).
104. Lawrence W. Newman & Michael Burrows, The Alien Tort Claims Act, N.Y. L.J., Dec.
29, 1995, at 3.
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violations during the course of the Bosnian Civil War pursuant to the
ATCA and the Torture Victims Protection Act.' °5 The defendant argued
that the ATCA, like the Torture Victims Protection Act, requires actions
by a "state actor" in order to establish liability based on a violation of
the law of nations.'0 6 However, the court rejected this argument stating,
"[w]e do not agree that the law of nations, as understood in the modern
era, confines its reach to state action. Instead, we hold that certain forms
of conduct violate the law of nations whether undertaken by those acting
under the auspices of a state or only as private individuals."'' 7
In support of this conclusion, the court, referring to various current
and historical sources as well as the Restatement (Third), noted the
availability of individual liability for "certain offenses" that receive
"universal concern" such as piracy, slave trade, and genocide.' 0 The
court proceeded to apply this reasoning to two of the specific acts
complained of in the litigation: genocide and war crimes. °9 Upon an
analysis of the Restatement (Third) and numerous international
agreements, the court determined that both of these acts are of universal
concern, and therefore prohibited by
0 the law of nations, regardless of the
defendant's status as a state actor.''
The court then analyzed a third category of offenses which it called
"other instances of inflicting death, torture, and degrading treatment" to
determine whether or not these offences are actionable against an
individual pursuant to the law of nations."' The court held that these
"alleged atrocities are actionable under the Alien Tort Act, without
regard to state action, to the extent that they were committed in pursuit
of genocide or war crimes, and otherwise may be pursued against
Karadzic to the extent that he is shown to be a state actor.""' 2 In dealing
with this state action requirement, the court analyzed the plaintiff's
'' 3
arguments that the Bosnian-Serb Republic referred to as "Srpska"
satisfies the definition of a state for the purposes of imposing obligations

105. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000). This act essentially codified the holding in Filartiga and
expressly provides a cause of action for plaintiffs who claim they have been victims of official
torture committed by persons acting under the color of state authority pursuant to the jurisdictional
grant of the ATCA and under the general federal question jurisdiction of § 1331. See id.
106. See Kadic, 70 F.3d at 239.
107. Id.
108. See id. at 239-40.
109. See id. at 241-43.
110. See id. at 240.
111. Id. at 241, 243-44.
112. Id.at 244.
113. The defendant was the President of the self-proclaimed "Srpska." See id. at 237.
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acted in concert
of international law, and alternatively, that Karadzic
14
Yugoslavia.'
former
of
state
recognized
with the
With respect to the plaintiff's first argument that Srpska fits the
definition of a state, the court concluded that the nature of the republic
appeared to satisfy the criteria for a state in all aspects of international
law." ' Regarding the plaintiff's alternative argument, the court, citing
Forti v. Suarez-Mason,16 stated that it considered the under the color of
law jurisprudence of section 1983 to be a relevant guide in determining
whether or not an individual has engaged in official action for the
purposes of imputing individual liability pursuant to the law of
nations.'17
Forti involved a civil action brought against a former Argentine
general pursuant to the ATCA by plaintiffs alleging human rights
violations committed by military personnel under the defendant's
command." 8 However, like the Filartigacourt," 9 the court in Forti did
not refer to section 1983 as a means to determine whether the law of
nations imposed obligations upon individuals who do not fall into the
category of a de facto state actor.' 20 Rather, the reference was made to
illustrate the inapplicability of the act of state doctrine to the defendant's
alleged conduct because according to that court, only acts of statepublic and governmental in nature-warranted immunity under the act
of state doctrine. 2 ' The court in Forti analogized section 1983 to the
ATCA simply to show that while the defendant's act was an act of state
that might be appropriate for scrutiny under section 1983, it was not a
"governmental and public action" contemplated by the act of state
doctrine.122 Because the Kadic court concluded that certain acts alleged
constituted violations of the law of nations regardless of the actor's23
status, and the specific use of section 1983 in Forti was not addressed,'
it is unclear why the court considered this domestic law necessary or
appropriate for the purposes of defining state action within the context of
114. See id. at 244.
115. See id. at 245.
116. 672 F. Supp. 1531 (N.D. Cal. 1987).
117. See Kadic, 70 F.3d at 245.
118. See Forti, 672 F. Supp. at 1537.
119. As noted in the previous section of this Note, the Filartiga court's use of section 1983 in
its analysis was for the purposes of illustrating the appropriateness of adjudicating extraterritorial
claims where the policies of the forum are similar to the policies of the jurisdiction where the claim
had arose.
120. See Forti, 672 F. Supp. at 1546.
121. See id. at 1544-46.
122. See id. at 1546.
123. See Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 245-46 (2d Cir. 1995).
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defining the obligations imposed by the law of nations upon private
individuals.
C. An Overextension ofAnalogies Leads to the Misapplicationof
Section 1983 in ATCA Cases
As was the case in Filartiga,the reference to section 1983 by the
Forti court was for the purposes of analyzing issues addressing the
subject matter jurisdiction of federal courts to adjudicate ATCA cases
brought against official agent's of foreign nations.1 4 It cannot be
construed as an endorsement of the use of section 1983 to define or
expand the obligations imposed by the law of nations by virtue of
section 1983's characterization of private action as state action. In fact,
the Forti court, referring to Filartiga,noted that, "a police chief who
tortures, or orders to be tortured, prisoners in his custody fulfills the
requirement that his action be 'official' simply by virtue of his position
and the circumstances of the act."'25 Therefore, because none of these
cases justify the use of section 1983 for the purposes of defining or
expanding the obligations imposed by the law of nations on private
individuals, courts seeking to apply section 1983 must articulate some
other justification for its use.
As a normative matter, even though holding private entities liable
for state action in the United States is consistent with the notion of
holding individuals liable for acts of state in the international arena, it is
questionable, as a matter of law and justice, whether importing section
1983 standards to do so is appropriate. That is because the ATCA has
not been construed "as granting new rights to aliens, but simply as
opening the federal courts for adjudication of the rights already
recognized by international law."'' 26 In light of the requirement that rules
of international law command the general assent of civilized nations
before they become binding, 27 the use of section 1983 to define and
expand the obligations imposed by the law of nations is improper as a
matter of law absent evidence of general assent and justification from
the law of nations.
Moreover, as a matter of justice, the use of section 1983 in
furtherance of the policies underlying ATCA litigation without

124. See supra notes 120-22 and accompanying text.
125. Forti, 672 F. Supp. at 1546 (citing Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 889 (2d
Cir. 1980)).
126. Filartiga,630 F.2d at 887.
127. See id. at 880.
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thoroughly considering the appropriateness of its standards, which were
calibrated to ensure civil rights to American citizens, potentially
effectuates the antithesis. That is because the application of a section
1983 analysis to violations of jus cogens creates an unnecessary obstacle
for ATCA plaintiffs alleging such violations, thereby causing liability to
turn on standards reflecting domestic sensibilities, vis-A-vis on
appropriate evidence that the specific act constitutes a violation of
universal international concern. Furthermore, within the context of
customary law, MNCs are now theoretically subject to liability
traditionally reserved for nation-states with neither proper legal
justification nor the availability of the full extent of jurisdictional blocks
that prevent nation-states from being sued in U.S. courts.'28 For these
reasons, courts should refrain from using section 1983 in ATCA cases to
raise individual defendants to the necessary status that would make them
amiable to suit for violations of the law of nations other than jus cogens.
IV.

ASCERTAINING THE APPROPRIATE SOURCES, DEFINITION, AND
APPLICATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

"The Second Circuit's decision in Filartigamarked the beginning
of a new era of reliance" on the ATCA.'29 The court held that the ATCA
constitutes a jurisdictional grant, allowing U.S. federal courts to hear
extraterritorial claims brought by aliens who allege a tort in violation of
customary international law. 3 The case is most notable perhaps for its
acknowledgment that the law of nations imposes certain rights and
duties upon individuals vis-A-vis a nation-state. By virtue of this
acknowledgement, the court held that the specific "act of torture
committed by a state official against one held in detention violates
established [rights and duties imposed by] the law of nations."'' In
reaching that decision, the court faced several obstacles, the first of
which was to ascertain the appropriate definition of international law for
the purpose of determining whether the alleged conduct violated the law

128. Examples of such jurisdictional blocks include the Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act of
1976 and the Act of the State Doctrine. See Brad J. Kieserman, Comment, Profits and Principles:
Promoting Multinational Corporate Responsibility by Amending the Alien Tort Claims Act, 48
CATH. U. L. REV. 881, 907-10 (1999).
129. Doe v. Unocal Corp., 110 F. Supp. 2d 1294, 1304 (C.D. Cal. 2000).
130. See Filartiga,630 F.2d at 884-85.
131. Id. at 880 (emphasis added).

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol31/iss1/6

20

Khalil: The Alien Tort Claims Act and Section 1983: The Improper Use of D

2002]

THE IMPROPER USE OF DOMESTIC LAWS

of nations thereby satisfying the first prong'32 of the ATCA on which the
plaintiff's based their case.'33

The Restatement (Third) identifies three sources of international
law: (1) international agreements (for example, treaties); (2) customary
international law; and (3) general principles of international law.'34 It
defines international law as those principles "that [have] been accepted
as such by the international community of states" by international
agreement or in the form of customary law created by consistent state
practice or by derivation from general principles common to the major
legal systems of the world.'35 Article 38 of the Statute of the
International Court of Justice codifies all three of these sources of
international law and instructs courts whose function it is to hear such
disputes to apply the rules of law ascertained from them accordingly.'36
In its simplest form, these international law norms can be
categorized into two groups: the written and the unwritten rules of
international law."' Written rules encompass the first source of
international law and consist of treaties, conventions, and other
international agreements. ' Unwritten rules, which are analogous to
Anglo-American common law, encompass the second and third sources
of international law consisting of both the customary and general
principles mentioned above.'39

Unwritten customary international law, a direct descendant of the
law of nations, "results from a general and consistent practice of states
followed by them from a sense of legal obligation.' ' 40 By definition, the
binding power of customary law is based on a state's continued
acquiescence of legal norms included within this source of law, which
are essentially created by that state's own general and consistent
132. By its express terms, the ATCA grants original jurisdiction to federal courts over civil
cases brought by aliens who allege a tort committed in violation of the Acts first prong, the law of
nations, or its second prong, a treaty of the United States. See 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000).
133. See Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 879.
134. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 47, § 102(1).
135. See id.
136. See Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38, 59 Stat. 1055, 1060 (1945). In this
respect, the statute states:
The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with international law such
disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply: (a) international conventions, whether general
or particular, establishing rules expressly recognized by the contesting states;
(b) international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law; (c) the
general principles of law recognized by civilized nations.
137. See LILLICH & HANNUM, supra note 42, at 93.
138. See id.
139. See id.
140.

RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 47, § 102(2).
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its applicability is limited to states consenting to
practices.' 4 ' As a result,
142
be governed by it.
Conversely, unwritten general principles of international law, orjus
cogens, are those "common to the major legal systems, even if not43
incorporated or reflected in customary law or international agreement."'
By definition, jus cogens are binding on nations even if they do not
agree to them.'" The binding force of jus cogens comes from a "rational
notion of basic moral norms . .. derived from values taken to be
fundamental by the international community" considered binding upon
all states, regardless of a particular state's consent or rejection of specific
practices included within this source of law. 45 Furthermore, due to the
nature of its justification, jus cogens "can only be derived from a rational
inquiry into what the world community considers just, not into what is in
the best interests of particular states or even of a majority of states.' 46 In
summary, therefore, before an unwritten rule of international law may
become binding as part of the law of nations, there must be a sufficiency
its recognition by the members of
of appropriate evidence to establish
47
the international community.'
A.

Filartiga's Analysis, An Extensive and Systematic Approach

As noted in Filartiga,the U.S. Supreme Court has accepted the
written and unwritten sources identified by the Restatement (Third) and
the International Court of Justice Statute as appropriate for the purpose
of defining and applying international law. 48 Accordingly, because the
plaintiff's claims alleged a tort in violation of the law of nations, the
Filartigacourt was forced to discern the applicable rules of international
law from an unwritten source. To meet that end, the court, citing express
rules offered by the Supreme Court to govern its analysis, 49 engaged in a
complex process of reasoning by which it would determine the

141. See Klein, supra note 76, at 350-52.
142. See id.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 47, § 102(4).
144. See Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Argentina, 965 F.2d 699, 715 (9th Cir. 1992).
145. Klein, supra note 76, at 351.
146. Id. at 352-53.
147. See, e.g., Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 672 F. Supp. 1531, 1540 (N.D. Cal. 1987) (stating the
requirement that there be sufficient criteria to establish that there is universal consensus regarding
the prohibition of an act before it can be considered a norm of international law).
148. See Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 880 (2d Cir. 1980).
149. Judge Kaufman guided his analysis of the proper definition international law by the
statements made by the Supreme Court in The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900). See Filartiga,
630 F.2d at 880-81.
143.
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appropriate and binding international legal norms. 5 ° However, it should
be noted that Filartiga,by limiting it's holding to customary law, 5' did
not clearly state whether jus cogens might also be used to establish
liability in ATCA cases.
The Filartigacourt began its analysis of customary law by noting
that "[t]he law of nations 'may be ascertained by consulting the works of
jurists, writing professedly on public law; or by the general usage and
practice of nations; or by judicial decisions recognizing and enforcing
that law."" 52 However, as a practical matter, the actual task of
ascertaining customary law is not only complex but arduous as well.'53
That is sufficiently demonstrated by the extensive and thorough nature
of the court's analysis, which included a lengthy discussion of numerous
relevant international documents.' 4 According to the court, that analysis
was necessary in ATCA cases because absent treaties, controlling
executive or legislative acts, or judicial decisions, courts must resort to
the often loosely defined rules of customary law as evidenced in the
works of jurists and scholars whose experience have established them as
experts in this field.'55 The complexity of this process is exacerbated by
the requirement that judges defining customary law in ATCA cases
consult these works, "'not for the speculations of their authors
concerning what the law
ought to be, but for trustworthy evidence of
'' 6
what the law really is. 5
By virtue of its definition, ascertaining jus cogens norms would
easily impose an even greater burden upon judges deciding ATCA
claims, as it would require "rational inquiry into what the world
community considers just, not into what is in the best interests of
particular states or even of a majority of states."" 7 In addition to this
moral element, identifying jus cogens norms is more difficult than norms
of customary law due to its higher standard of justification created by its
commonality among the major legal systems of the world vis-A-vis the
150. See Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 879-84.
151. See id. at 884 ("Having examined the sources from which customary international law is
derived-the usage of nations, judicial opinions and the works of jurists-we conclude that official
torture is now prohibited by the law of nations.") (emphasis added).
152. Id. at 880.
153. See id. at 880-84.
154. See id. Within this section of the opinion, the court performed an extensive analysis of
numerous judicial decisions, international treaties, declarations and resolutions, works by scholars
and jurists who have written extensively on the subject of international law, as well as appropriate
statutes of the International Court of Justice. See id.
155. See id. at 880-81.
156. Id.at881.
157. Klein, supra note 76, at 352-53.
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general or consistent practice followed among states required for
customary law.'58 Nevertheless, in light of Filartiga's "stringent"
requirement that customary law command the general assent of civilized
nations to become binding upon them, 59 approaches similar in
complexity would seem necessary to justify a finding that a particular
act is proscribed by jus cogens or customary law.
B.

The Appropriate Application of Unwritten InternationalLaw to
PrivateIndividuals in ATCA Litigation

The FilartigaCourt's complex approach towards ascertaining the
appropriate definition of customary law exemplifies the fact that not
only is unwritten international law difficult to define, its amorphous and
transient nature further complicates its application to current issues6
regarding the individual's rights and obligations imposed by that law.' 0
With that in mind, it was the court's interpretation of customary law as it
exists today, in connection with its recognition that the torturer has
become hostis humani generis (an enemy of mankind), 6' which guided
its analysis and facilitated its finding 62 of individual liability for a
violation of customary international law.
With respect to identifying the rights and obligations imposed by
customary law, the Filartigacourt stated its concern that these norms
"command the 'general assent of civilized nations'' as required by the
Supreme Court before they become binding upon them. 63 The reason for
this is to avoid the imposition by one nation of idiosyncratic legal rules
upon another in the name of applying international law.' 64 Consequently,
the Filartigacourt justified its watershed holding only after extensive
analysis of evidence of customary law in the form of express assertions
made in the United Nations Charter, numerous treaties and accords,
judicial opinions, as well as in the works of jurists and scholars' 65 to
acknowledge the specific notion that official torture committed by a de
facto state actor has received sufficient global condemnation as to
158. See id. at 350-53.
159. See Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 881.
160. See Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 781 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Edwards, J.,
concurring) (stating that the approach of the Filartiga court "places an awesome duty on federal
district courts to derive from an amorphous entity-i.e., the 'law of nations'-standards of liability
applicable in concrete situations").
161. See Filartiga,630 F.2d at 890.
162. See id. at 880.
163. Id. at 881 (citing The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 694 (1900)).
164. See id. (emphasis added).
165. See id. at 880-84.
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constitute a violation of customary law.166 Therefore, to protect the
integrity of Filartiga'sapproach, courts must pay great deference to the
requirement that a particular norm of customary law must in fact
command the general assent of civilized nations before they become
binding.
Within the context of jus cogens, the statements made in Xuncax v.
Gramajo,167 which held the ATCA only to apply to violations of jus
cogens, illustrates the even greater lengths by which a court must go to
identify and support the existence of such norms. According to Xuncax,
before a norm of international law can be actionable under the ATCA, it
must be established as "universal, definable and obligatory.' ' 68 More
specifically, the court stated that these qualifications require that no state
condone the act in question, that there be a universal consensus of
prohibition against it,
and that there be sufficient criteria to determine
69
these qualifications.
To Illustrate the stringent requirement that there exist evidence
supporting international accord that either customary law or jus cogens
proscribe a particular act before becoming a binding norm of the law of
nations, the decision in Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino7 ° is
particularly instructive. In Banco Nacional de Cuba, which involved the
validity of the Cuban government's exportation of a foreign-owned
corporation's assets, the Supreme Court held that U.S. courts should not
decide issues of international law when those issues have not been
clearly recognized to fall within the ambit of such law.'' For that reason,
courts addressing questions of liability under the ATCA should not
decide any issues with respect to the individual obligations imposed by
international law in the absence of evidence establishing the requisite
consensus among the international community that a particular act is
proscribed by the law of nations when committed by a private
individual.
Filartigacomports with the warning in Banco Nacional de Cuba
because individual liability in that case was based solely on evidence
166. See id. at 884.
167. 886 F. Supp. 162 (D. Mass. 1995).
168. Id. at 184.
169. See id.
170. 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
171. See id. at 428 (holding that "the Judicial Branch [of the United States] will not examine
the validity of a taking of property within its own territory by a foreign sovereign government,
extant and recognized by this country at the time of suit, in the absence of a treaty or other
unambiguous agreement regarding controlling legal principles, even if the complaint alleges that the
taking violates customary international law").
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that the law of nations has sufficiently defined the norms upon which it
was premised. By virtue of that evidence, to hold an individual liable for
violations of customary law, Filartiga concluded that the individual
must be a de facto state actor engaged in the act of torture while acting
in an official capacity.
As a matter of international law, it is necessary to limit application
of customary law to de facto state actors absent evidence of international
accord to the contrary.17 This limitation is needed to establish an
appropriate nexus between actor and state necessary to impute state
reserved liability to acts of its agent. "4 As a practical matter, only the
acts of an official state agent can be clearly and factually attributed to
the state in which the actions took place by virtue of the status and
authority conferred upon the state actor by her state.7 5 Therefore, absent
internationally recognized standards defining the nature of state action
necessary to impute state reserved liability to an individual, imputation
76
of statist law must be limited to de facto state actors as a matter of law.
Cases which seek to impose individual liability on persons other
than de facto state actors are essentially required to follow the same
painstaking analysis utilized by Filartiga to avoid the improper
expansion of the rights and obligations imposed on individuals by the
law of nations.'77 Accordingly, because the imposition of individual
liability for violations of customary law on individuals established as
state actors merely by virtue of section 1983 does not satisfy this
requirement, it is improper as a matter of law.

172. See Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 880 (2d Cir. 1980).
173. See infra notes 175-77 and accompanying text.
174. See supra notes 141-48 and accompanying text. This nexus is necessary because unlike
jus cogens, customary law is only binding upon those states that have accepted it as such by virtue
of that state's own general and consistent practices. See id.
175. See supra notes 51-59 and accompanying text.
176. See id.
177. This statement is justified by the Supreme Court's holding in Banco Nacional de Cuba v.
Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964), which prohibits United States courts from deciding issues that are
not clearly defined within international law and as a means to avoid violation of the express warning
offered by Filartiga against the imposition of idiosyncratic rules of law by one nation upon another.
See, e.g., Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 791 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Edwards, J.,
concurring) (refusing to apply the holding in Filartiga to the defendant for failure to "allege facts to
show that official or state-initiated torture [was] implicated in [that] action"); see also supra notes
35-39 and accompanying text (discussing the codification of the specific and narrow holding of
Filartiga in the Tortured Victims Protection Act as well as its general approval by Congress and
other jurisdictions).
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THE JUSTICIABILITY OF CASES BROUGHT PURSUANT TO THE ATCA

A. A Lack of History and PrecedentLeads to Confusion
As noted supra, the ATCA provides that "district courts shall have
original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only,
committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United
States."'' While the language of the Act expressly states that district
courts shall have jurisdiction to hear claims brought by aliens, issues
regarding the justiciability of such cases presented a second obstacle for
the court in Filartiga. At issue is whether the ATCA constitutes a
congressional recognition of a private cause of action as well as a
congressional grant of jurisdiction to hear such claims. Courts have been
unable to reach a consensus as to the statute's import regarding these
two issues primarily because of the lack of precedent in interpreting the
ATCA as well as its insufficient legislative history.
The ATCA was enacted by Congress as part of the First Judiciary
Act of 1789, and has been rarely invoked until its resurrection almost
two hundred years later in Filartiga 9 For that reason, judges
adjudicating ATCA claims have been forced to divine the appropriate
application of this Act with little direct guidance from established
judicial opinions. Furthermore, resort to legislative history does not
solve the dilemma since there is no reference to the ATCA in the debates
that led to its passage, nor is there any direct evidence of what the First
Congress intended it to accomplish.8 0 Judicial opinions, therefore, have
utilized varying approaches in ascertaining the intended purpose and
effect of this statute.
B. A Narrow Versus a BroadInterpretation
In an article regarding the application of international human rights
law in domestic courts, one commentator contends that the domestic
applicability of international legal norms by private parties depends
primarily on whether such norms are "self-executing."'' "A principle is
self-executing if it is enforceable in domestic courts by its own terms,
without recourse to specific implementing legislation."'8 2 Under the

178.
179.
180.
181.

28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000).
See In re Marcos, 978 F.2d 493, 498 (9th Cir. 1992).
See id.
See Klein, supra note 76, at 333.

182. Id.
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Supremacy Clause, duly ratified treaties are expressly incorporated into
the supreme law of the land.1 3 "However, while the Supremacy Clause
automatically executes treaties into [domestic] law," creating rights upon
which private parties may assert their claims, "it says nothing about
international [law] not backed by treaty.' 84 Therefore, to give unwritten
international law domestic effect once jurisdiction has been obtained,
plaintiffs basing their claim on a violation of this law must articulate a
theory locating its binding force and defining the substantive
prerequisites of its application.'85
Courts applying both broad and narrow interpretations of the
ATCA have disagreed as to whether it creates both a forum as well as a
cause of action for violations of international law or whether it is merely
jurisdictional by its terms.8 6 The broadest reading of the ATCA, as
evidence of congressional recognition of a cause of action, is that the
ATCA merely requires that a plaintiff prove that a tort was committed in
violation of the law of nations.' 7 Conversely, courts applying a narrow
interpretation of the ATCA have held that it does not create an
independent cause of action because the law of nations is not, by itself,
self-executing. 1 8 As a result, these courts conclude that a plaintiff must
assert a right to sue expressly granted by the international law of which a
violation is claimed and in the absence of this grant, by federal statute. 8 9
The results of both approaches are illuminated by an analysis of
Filartigaand subsequent cases.
As noted in previous sections of this Note, the court in Filartiga
held that the ATCA constitutes a jurisdictional grant by Congress to
allow federal courts to hear such claims.' 9 The court, by virtue of a
broad interpretation, concluded that the ATCA opens the federal courts
for adjudication of the rights already recognized by the law of nations.' 9'
Four years later, in a per curiam decision by the D.C. Circuit in TelOren v. Libyan Arab Republic,'92 the issues of justiciability raised by
183. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl.
2.
184. Klein, supra note 76, at 333.
185. See id. at 334.
186. See, e.g., Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162, 179 (D. Mass. 1995) (noting that the
answer to whether the ATCA, by its terms, creates both a cause of action and forum to assert the
claim lies in whether or not the ATCA is to be given a broad or narrow interpretation).
187. See Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 811 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Bork, J.,
concurring).
188. See, e.g., id.
189. See id. at 799 (Bork, J., concurring).
190. See Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 887 (2d Cir. 1980).
191. See id.
192. 726 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
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Filartigawere reevaluated by the concurrences of Judges Robb, Bork
and Edwards in a case involving international terrorism brought against
the Palestinian Liberation Organization. The three judges employed
radically different analyses to conclude that acts of terrorism are not
justiciable in U.S. courts under the ATCA.'93
Judge Robb concluded that by virtue of the political question
doctrine,94 "[f]ederal courts are not in a position to determine the
international status of terrorist attacks," and for that reason, denied
jurisdiction under the ATCA.' 95 In his concurrence, Judge Bork affirmed
the dismissal of the case on jurisdictional grounds, but for different
reasons concerning the plaintiff's failure to state a cause of action
sufficient to support jurisdiction under the ATCA.' 96 By employing a
narrow reading of the ATCA, he held that by itself, the ATCA does not
provide a cause of action and therefore, required that the plaintiff assert
an express right to sue granted by the law of nations.' 9 Moreover, based

on the principles of separation of powers, he refused to infer a cause of
action where one was not expressly granted by the law of the nations.' 8
While these holdings would drastically limit the kinds of cases that
can be brought under the ATCA due to political questions and the
requirement of an express right to sue,'99 the reasoning by Judge

Edwards is broader in scope and along with Filartiga,has been relied
upon by courts finding ATCA cases to be justiciable.2 ° Judge Edwards
endorsed the logic of Filartigaand concluded that jurisdiction is held
proper upon a showing "that the defendant's actions violated the

193. See Klein, supra note 76, at 343.
194. This is the principle that the judiciary should not decide issues involving the exercise of
discretionary powers by the executive or legislative branches of government. See BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1179 (7th ed. 1999).
195. Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 823 (Robb, J., concurring).
196. See id. at 799 (Bork, J., concurring).
197. See id. at 811 (Bork, J., concurring). Judge Bork supported his reasoning by arguing that
since there was neither the concept of international human rights, nor any recognition of a right of
private parties to recover under the traditional concept of customary law at the time the ATCA was
enacted, Congress could not have intended that these concepts be included within its definition of
the law of nations. See id. at 813.
198. See id. at 801 (Bork, J., concurring) (noting that the doctrine of separation of powers
limits the judiciary's power to adjudicate issues dealing with foreign relations by virtue of the
political question and act of state doctrine discussed in greater detail in this section).
199. See Klein, supra note 76, at 343-46.
200. See, e.g., Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 672 F. Supp. 1531, 1539 (N.D. Cal. 1987) (stating that
the interpretation of the ATCA by Judge Edwards vis-a-vis Judges Bork and Robb "is better
reasoned and more consistent with principles of international law"); Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F.
Supp. 162, 179-81 (D. Mass. 1995) (rejecting Judge Bork's interpretation of the ATCA in favor of
the interpretation by Judge Edwards).
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substantive law of nations" even without an express right to sue as
required by the narrow interpretation of Judge Bork.' ° ' Nevertheless, he
denied jurisdiction because the Palestinian Liberation Organization
could not violate the law of nations since it is neither a recognized
member of the community of nations, nor was it a de facto state actor. 202
In further support of his decision, Judge Edwards stated that there is
insufficient evidence of a universal condemnation of the act of terrorism
for it to amount to a law of nations violation. °3
C. Application of Filartiga's Broad Approach to Individuals Including
MNCs as Defendants in ATCA Cases
Because application of the narrow approach would essentially work
to preclude the justiciability of most cases that could be brought
2' the broad interpretation
pursuant to the ATCA, including Filartiga,
adopted by Filartigaand endorsed by Judge Edwards in Tel-Oren has
premised the reasoning of federal judges willing to hear most ATCA
cases. 05 By virtue of Filartiga'sbroad approach, cases brought pursuant
to the ATCA are justiciable simply upon a showing that the acts of the
particular defendant violate the law of nations. 26 For that reason, the
appropriate definition of the individual obligations imposed by the law
of nations is critical to the question of whether federal courts have
subject matter jurisdiction to hear ATCA cases.
Within the context of individual liability under customary law, the
previous section of this Note established law as only imposing
obligations on de facto state actors accused of violating a norm for
which there is sufficient evidence establishing a general consent among
civilized nations.2' The application of section 1983 to MNCs to
characterize private action as state action, thereby raising the MNC to a
status by which the law of nations may impose obligations, acts to
improperly expand the jurisdictional grant defined by cases adopting
Filartiga'sapproach, because as a matter of law, defendants established
merely as de jure vis-a-vis de facto state actors cannot violate customary
law. As a result, because Filartiga'sbroad approach requires a violation
201. Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 776-77 (Edwards, J., concurring) (explaining the holding of
Filartiga).
202. Seeid. at 791.
203. See id. at795-96.
204. See Klein, supra note 76, at 343-46.
205. See, e.g., Forti, 672 F. Supp. at 1539; Xuncax, 886 F. Supp. at 179-81.
206. See Filartiga v. Pena-lrala, 630 F.2d 876, 887 (2d Cir. 1980).
207. See supra Part IV.B.
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of the law of nations for jurisdiction purposes,2 8 section 1983 may not
be used to establish that violation without sufficient evidence that de jure
state actors have the same obligations as de facto state actors under
customary law. °9
The use of section 1983 is also improper with respect to
determining jurisdiction for jus cogens violations under the ATCA
because application of that law improperly limits the jurisdictional grant
recognized by Filartiga's broad approach. Within that context,
establishment of state action is unnecessary because violations of jus
cogens violate the law of nations regardless of the defendant's status as a
private or state actor,"" thereby establishing jurisdiction under the
ATCA. This reasoning is in harmony with the concept of universality
jurisdiction found in international law, which allows any state to
exercise jurisdiction over violations of jus cogens, even absent some
other basis of jurisdiction.
VI. CONCLUSION
As many cases interpreting the ATCA illustrate, the use of section
1983 to define and create the obligations imposed upon individuals
(including MNCs) by the law of nations is problematic for several
reasons. With respect to defining individual obligations imposed by jus
cogens, the employment of section 1983 creates an unnecessary obstacle
for ATCA plaintiffs alleging such violations by causing liability to turn
on an analysis of domestic law vis-a-vis on evidence that the alleged act
constitutes a violation of universal international concern.212 This problem
is exemplified by the recent Ninth Circuit decision in Doe v. Unocal,
which by virtue of the obligations imposed by jus cogens, reversed an
earlier decision that refused to find individual liability based upon its
application of section 1983 standards for state action. Furthermore,
section 1983 improperly limits the jurisdictional grant of the ATCA
recognized for claims allegingjus cogens violations."' Consequently, the
unnecessary obstacles created through the application of section 1983 to

208. See Filartiga,630 F.2d at 884.
209. See id. at 881 (requiring a general consent among civilized nations before a norm of
customary law can become binding).
210. See supra notes 27-28 and accompanying text (supporting the notion that violations ofjus
cogens are proscribed by the law of nations regardless of the presence of state action).
211. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 47, § 404.
212. See supra notes 62-65 and accompanying text.
213. See supra notes 211-12 and accompanying text.
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jus cogens flies in the face of the policies underlying most ATCA
litigation.
Section 1983 is also inappropriate for the purposes of defining the
individual obligations imposed by customary law. This is because the
obligations imposed upon individuals in this context result merely from
an arbitrary application of domestic standards, vis-A-vis by virtue of a
justified mandate from the law of nations evidenced by a general assent
among civilized nations as required by the majority of cases interpreting
the ATCA.' 4
The requirement of general consensus must not be taken lightly
when dealing with individuals other than de facto state actors because
unless a norm of international law is established as a jus cogens, it
merely constitutes a custom or usage of much lesser importance that is
only binding among those states that have adopted it as such by its own
consistent practice.215 Therefore, by definition, a mere rejection of that
practice would essentially relieve that state of its self-imposed
obligation. Accordingly, it is improper as a matter of law to hold a
private entity liable for these customs because their status serves to
preclude them from being able to either endorse or reject a custom of
international law. Moreover, because private entities are unable to
violate customary law, the ATCA cannot grant subject matter
jurisdiction to federal courts to hear such claims.2 6
Notwithstanding the problems associated with individual liability
under the law of nations, a blanket rule against the imposition of
particular forms of international liability for human rights violations
facilitated by MNCs is improper as a matter of justice. There may exist
certain situations in which it is proper to subject MNCs to international
liability other than those implicating violations of jus cogens. To justify
this result, however, proper standards for determining individual liability
such as the "aiding and abetting" test employed by the Ninth Circuit in
Doe v. Unocal must be employed. To that end, the Supreme Court
should recognize the impropriety of using section 1983 standards for the
purposes of defining and creating obligations never contemplated by the

214. See supra notes 161-77 and accompanying text.
215. See id.
216. See supra notes 208-10 and accompanying text.
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law of nations pursuant to the ATCA. This would launch the pursuit of a
more credible pretext to validate the just practice of holding any entity,
not just nation-states, liable for committing egregious international
human rights law violations.
Samuel A. Khalil*
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